In Federalist No. 15, Hamilton takes up the question of “the
insufficiency of the present confederation to the preservation of the union.” Hamilton
begins his paper with a classic depiction of the “last stage of national
humiliation” facing the disunited states. But he still felt obligated to show
that “the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial
imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building,
which cannot be amended, otherwise than by an alteration in the very elements
and main pillars of the fabric.”
* * *
The great and radical vice, in the construction of the
existing confederation, is in the principle of legislation for states or
governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as
contradistinguished from the individuals of whom they consist. Though this
principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the union; yet it
pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends: except,
as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite
discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority
to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of
America. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory, their resolutions
concerning those objects, are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of
the union; yet, in practice, they are mere recommendations, which the states
observe or disregard at their option.
It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human
mind, that, after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head,
there should still be found men, who object to the new constitution, for
deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old; and which
is, in itself, evidently incompatible with the idea of a government; a
principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the
violent and sanguinary agency of the sword, to the mild influence of the magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable, in the idea of a
league or alliance between independent nations, for certain defined purposes
precisely stated in a treaty; regulating all the details of time, place,
circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending
for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind,
exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace
and war; of observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the
contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century, there was
an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts; from which the
politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized.
With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power, and the peace of that
part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple
and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before they
were broken, giving an instructive, but afflicting, lesson to mankind, how
little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than
the obligations of good faith; and which oppose general considerations of peace
and justice, to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion.
If the particular states in this country are disposed to
stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general
discretionary superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would
entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first
head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and
practicable. Abandoning all views towards a confederate government, this would
bring us to a simple alliance, offensive and defensive; and would place us in a
situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual
jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations,
should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous
situation; if we still adhere to the design of a national government, or, which
is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common
council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients, which
may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and
a government; we must extend the authority of the union to the persons of the
citizens . . . the only proper objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential
to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words,
a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to
disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws, will in
fact amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty,
whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways; by the agency of the
courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the coercion of the
magistracy, or by the coercion of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only
to men: the last kind must of necessity be employed against bodies politic, or
communities or states. It is evident, that there is no process of a court by
which their observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced.
Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these
sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association,
where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the
communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of
war, and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience.
Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor
would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the
states, of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected;
that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the
respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the
constitutional requisitions of the union. This language, at the present day,
would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter
will be thought, when we shall have received further lessons from that best
oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true
springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements
to the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at all?
Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and
justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more
rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this
has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and the
inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation, has a less
active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a
number, than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is
apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often
hurry the persons, of whom they are composed, into improprieties and excesses,
for which they would blush in a private capacity.
In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of
sovereign power, an impatience of control, which disposes those who are
invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external
attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens,
that in every political association which is formed upon the principle of
uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be
found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the
operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the
common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its
origin in the love of power. Power controled or abridged is almost always the
rival and enemy of that power by which it is controled or abridged. This simple
proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the
persons entrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular
members of a confederacy, will at all times be ready, with perfect good humour,
and an unbiassed regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions or
decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the
constitution of man. . . .
In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign
wills is requisite under the confederation, to the complete execution of every
important measure, that proceeds from the union. It has happened, as was to
have been foreseen. The measures of the union have not been executed; the
delinquencies of the states have, step by step, matured themselves to an
extreme, which has at length arrested all the wheels of the national
government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely
possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till the states
can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present
shadow of a federal government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity
at once. The causes which have been specified, produced at first only unequal
and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the union.
The greater deficiencies of some states furnished the pretext of example, and
the temptation of interest to the complying, or at least delinquent states. Why
should we do more in proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same
political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of
the common burthen? These were suggestions which human selfishness could not
withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote
consequences, could not without hesitation combat. Each state, yielding to the
persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively
withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall
upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.
