In his speech of June
28, 1787, in the Federal Convention, James Madison was debating with
representatives of the small states the question of their representation in the
proposed federal government, and was concerned to show that the small states
had nothing to fear from combinations of the larger states, that in fact their
true interest was to subordinate themselves to a general authority as much as
possible. Only then could they be secure. In making his demonstration, Madison
showed that he had reflected greatly on the history of independent states and
nations:
Was a combination of the large ones dreaded? This must arise
either from some interest common to Virginia, Massachusetts, & Pennsylvania
distinguishing them from the other States or from the mere circumstance of
similarity of size. Did any such common interest exist? In point of situation
they could not have been more effectually separated from each other by the most
jealous citizen of the most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and
the other circumstances which sometimes beget affection between different
communities, they were not more assimilated than the other States.—In point of
the staple productions they were as dissimilar as any three other States in the
Union. The Staple of Massachusetts was fish, of Pennsylvania flower, of Virginia
tobacco.
Was a combination to be apprehended from the mere circumstance of
equality of size? Experience suggested no such danger. The journals of Congress
did not present any peculiar association of these States in the votes recorded.
It had never been seen that different Counties in the same State, conformable
in extent, but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a propensity to
such combinations. Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among
individuals of superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships were much
more frequent than coalitions.
Among independent nations, pre-eminent over
their neighbours, the same remark was verified. Carthage & Rome tore one
another to pieces instead of uniting their forces to devour the weaker nations
of the Earth. The Houses of Austria & France were hostile as long as they
remained the greatest powers of Europe. England & France have succeeded to
the pre-eminence & to the enmity. To this principle we owe perhaps our
liberty. A coalition between those powers would have been fatal to us.
Among
the principal members of antient & Modern confederacies, we find the same
effect from the same cause. The contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta,
Athens & Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of the Amphyctionic
Confederacy. The contentions, not the combinations of Prussia & Austria,
have distracted & oppressed the Germanic empire.
Were the large States
formidable singly to their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the latter
ought to wish for such a general Government as will operate with equal energy
on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band, the more liberty the
larger will have to avail themselves of their superior force. Here again
Experience was an instructive monitor. What is the situation of the weak
compared with the strong in those stages of civilization in which the violence
of individuals is least controuled by an efficient Government? The Heroic
period of Antient Greece, the feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of
Europe, the existing condition of the American Savages, answer this question.
What is the situation of the minor sovereigns in the great society of
independent nations, in which the more powerful are under no controul but the
nominal authority of the law of Nations? Is not the danger to the former
exactly in proportion to their weakness. But there are cases still more in
point. What was the condition of the weaker members of the Amphyctionic
Confederacy. Plutarch [58 life of Themistocles] will inform us that it happened
but too often that the strongest cities corrupted & awed the weaker, and
that Judgment went in favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition
of the lesser states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they are exceedingly
trampled 'upon; and that they owe their safety as far as they enjoy it, partly
to their enlisting themselves, under the rival banners of the pre-eminent
members, partly to alliances with neighbouring Princes which the Constitution
of the Empire does not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax system
of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains about ½ the people, supplies about ½
of the money, and by her influence, silently & indirectly governs the whole
republic.
In a word; the two extremes before us are a perfect separation &
a perfect incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first case they would be independent
nations subject to no law, but the law of nations. In the last, they would be
mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one common law. In the first
case the smaller States would have every thing to fear from the larger. In the
last they would have nothing to fear.
The true policy of the small States therefore
lies in promoting those principles & that form of Government which will
most approximate the States to the condition of counties. Another consideration
may be added. If the General Government be feeble, the large States distrusting
its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance & security may depend
on their own size & strength, will never submit to a partition. Give to the
General Government sufficient energy & permanency, & you remove the
objection. Gradual partitions of the large, & junctions of the small States
will be facilitated, and time may effect that equalization, which is wished for
by the small States now, but can never be accomplished at once.
* * *
Source: Documents
Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, edited
by Charles C. Tansill. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927), 292-294.
I have filled out abbreviations and split the speech into separate paragraphs.
